Skills/PyPI/securityscan-mcp

securityscan-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Unified MCP server — give your AI agent the ability to secure its own environment." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 726 daysInstalls 89Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACTIVESCANNER_API_KEYDEPSCAN_API_KEYSECRETSCAN_API_BASESECRETSCAN_API_KEYSECURITYSCAN_API_KEYSECURITYSTACK_API_KEYSKILLSCAN_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ACTIVESCANNER_API_BASE, DEPSCAN_API_BASE, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_PATH, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, SECURITYSCAN_API_BASE, SKILLSCAN_API_BASE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso stripe.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names stripe.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACTIVESCANNER_API_KEY, DEPSCAN_API_KEY, SECRETSCAN_API_BASE, SECRETSCAN_API_KEY, SECURITYSCAN_API_KEY, SECURITYSTACK_API_KEY, SKILLSCAN_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx securityscan-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstack/mcp_audit.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSENSITIVE_PATHS = re.compile(r"(?i)(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|\.aws|\.config|credentials|\.npmrc|\.gitconfig)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsstack/mcp_audit.py:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("File exfiltration instruction", r"(?i)\b(read|cat|open|load).{0,40}(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|credentials|secrets?)\b", "critical"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellstack/mcp_audit.py:9 · Remote installer piped to shell3. Supply chain risk — unpinned npx/uvx package fetches, curl|bash installsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternstack/mcp_audit.py:157 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codedetail="Instalación tipo 'curl | bash' — ejecuta código remoto sin verificación.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedstack/mcp_audit.py:46 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content("Zero-width Unicode", "[​‌‍⁠]", "high"),Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstack/unified_mcp_server.py:156 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesbackend failure must not kill the whole combined report."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellstack/mcp_audit.py:157 · Remote installer piped to shelldetail="Instalación tipo 'curl | bash' — ejecuta código remoto sin verificación.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for securityscan-mcp@0.2.0 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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