secobserve-mcp@1.0.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for SecObserve: triage findings, import scan reports and SBOMs, generate VEX." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso acme.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
&& rm -rf /wheelsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if subprocess.run(("uv", "lock"), cwd=ROOT, check=False).returncode:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(("git", *args), cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.prettier-ignoreFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.if subprocess.run(command, cwd=ROOT, check=False).returncode:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._spec.loader.exec_module(release)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.release = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for secobserve-mcp@1.0.0 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nh4ttruong: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.