Skills/PyPI/sec-intelligence-mcp

sec-intelligence-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for SEC EDGAR filing intelligence (search, retrieval, evaluation)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jahanvi-jahanv01 · publishing for 66 daysInstalls 119Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add sec-intelligence-mcp -- uvx sec-intelligence-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYLANGFUSE_SECRET_KEYQDRANT_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EMBEDDING_MODEL, GEMINI_MODEL, HF_HOME, LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY, MCP_TRANSPORT, QDRANT_URL, SEC_EDGAR_USER_AGENT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso sec.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names sec.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY, LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY, QDRANT_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sec-intelligence-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:20 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:34 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /app/data && chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Only reachable/meaningful when MCP_TRANSPORT=sse is set in .env (e.g. for a hosted VMFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"{', '.join(_missing)}. Copy .env.example to .env and fill in the values."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# not when it's present but blank, which is exactly what .env.example ships for everyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_tool_analyze_filing.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRequires Qdrant running with NVDA already ingested, and a real GEMINI_API_KEY in .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_tool_get_filing_summary.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRequires Qdrant running with AAPL already ingested, and a real GEMINI_API_KEY in .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesper .env.example's documented pattern) and got "" instead of the default -- os.getenv'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestriggers langfuse.get_client()) -- otherwise, since .env has real LangFuse credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_faithfulness.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRequires Qdrant running with NVDA already ingested, and a real GEMINI_API_KEY in .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Regression test: a real deployment shipped `.env` with these left blank (not unset,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionevaluation/run_eval.py:15 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data fileseval/results/batch3.json --output eval/results/2026-08-20.jsonFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sec-intelligence-mcp@0.1.1 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.