Skills/PyPI/searxng-mcp-server

searxng-mcp-server@0.1.9

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for SearxNG" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher icewreck · publishing for 406 daysInstalls 338Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add searxng-mcp-server -- uvx searxng-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS or --cors-allow-credentialsConfiguration, not credentials: CORS_ALLOW_HEADERS, CORS_ALLOW_METHODS, CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS, MCP_PORT, SEARXNG_TIMEOUT, SEARXNG_URL, SEARXNG_USER_AGENT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso searx.be — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names searx.be as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx searxng-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:14 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)pyproject.toml:14 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkurls = { Homepage = "https://github.com/IceWreck/SearxNG-MCP-Server", Repository = "https://github.com/IceWreck/SearxNG-MCP-Server" }Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:16 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files-include .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestouch .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsMakefile:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexport $(shell sed 's/=.*//' .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,967 tok
3 files · 18 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for searxng-mcp-server@0.1.9 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.