Skills/PyPI/sd-api-mcp

sd-api-mcp@0.3.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server wrapping the Stable Diffusion WebUI API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hizzaniya · publishing for 161 daysInstalls 90Last detonated 56 min ago
$claude mcp add sd-api-mcp -- uvx sd-api-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SD_AUTH_PASSSD_AUTH_USERConfiguration, not credentials: REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SD_WEBUI_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso docker.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names docker.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SD_AUTH_PASS, SD_AUTH_USER only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sd-api-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files├── .env.example # 環境変数テンプレートFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:97 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x08\x02\x00\x00\x00\x90wS\xde\x00\x00\x00\x0cIDATx\x9cc\xf8\x0f\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.devcontainer/Dockerfile:23 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl https://mise.run | sh && mise use --global [email protected] node@22Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:86 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x08\x02\x00\x00\x00\x90wS\xde\x00\x00\x00\x0cIDATx\x9cc\xf8\x0f\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detected.devcontainer/Dockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:85 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.devcontainer/Dockerfile:11 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chmod go+r /etc/apt/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.devcontainer/Dockerfile:23 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl https://mise.run | sh && mise use --global [email protected] node@22Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detected.devcontainer/Dockerfile:15 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.devcontainer/docker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- ../.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.devcontainer/Dockerfile:32 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeRUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s stableFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.env.example` を参照:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:87 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x00\x01\x01\x00\x05\x18\xd8N\x00\x00\x00\x00IEND\xaeB`\x82"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.devcontainer/Dockerfile:32 · Remote installer piped to shellRUN curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash -s stableFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_server.py:96 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈719 tok
2 files · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sd-api-mcp@0.3.1 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.