Skills/PyPI/scrape-n-search-mcp

scrape-n-search-mcp@0.1.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server unifying web-search and scraping providers behind a few agent tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hughyyy · publishing for 27 daysInstalls 187Last detonated 57 min ago
$claude mcp add scrape-n-search-mcp -- uvx scrape-n-search-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EXA_API_KEYFIRECRAWL_API_KEYJINA_API_KEYSCRAPPEY_API_KEYSERPER_API_KEYTAVILY_API_KEYTINYFISH_API_KEYZENROWS_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_TTL, DEFAULT_PROVIDER, ENABLED_TOOLS, HTTP_TIMEOUT, JINA_KEYLESS, PROVIDER_PRIORITY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso exa.ai, firecrawl.dev, jina.ai, scrappey.com, serper.dev, tavily.com, tinyfish.ai, zenrows.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names exa.ai, firecrawl.dev, jina.ai, scrappey.com, serper.dev, tavily.com, tinyfish.ai, zenrows.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EXA_API_KEY, FIRECRAWL_API_KEY, JINA_API_KEY, SCRAPPEY_API_KEY, SERPER_API_KEY, TAVILY_API_KEY, TINYFISH_API_KEY, ZENROWS_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx scrape-n-search-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scrape_n_search/__main__.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env from the working directory (or its parents), then fall back toFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patterntests/test_install_mcp.py:89 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"""--ask on a piped stdin (curl | bash) must degrade to 'declined', not crash."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scrape_n_search/__main__.py:71 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(PROJECT_DIR / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scrape_n_search/__main__.py:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# the project's own .env. Existing environment variables take precedence andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scrape_n_search/__main__.py:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env regardless of the process working directory.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelltests/test_install_mcp.py:89 · Remote installer piped to shell"""--ask on a piped stdin (curl | bash) must degrade to 'declined', not crash."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for scrape-n-search-mcp@0.1.1 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.