Skills/PyPI/scout-mcp-server

scout-mcp-server@1.8.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for browser automation with anti-detection. Scout pages, find elements, interact with websites, and monitor network traffic." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher stemado · publishing for 252 daysInstalls 67Last detonated 57 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SCOUT_ALLOW_LOCALHOST, SCOUT_BROWSE_MAX_LENGTH, SCOUT_BROWSE_MODEL, SCOUT_BROWSE_TIMEOUT, SCOUT_CHROME_NM_PATH, SCOUT_ENV_FILE, SCOUT_EXTENSION_ID, SCOUT_PROFILE_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, pypa.io, linkedin.com, twilio.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, pypa.io, linkedin.com, twilio.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx scout-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…lidation happens. **Secret isolation** — `fill_secret` reads credentials from `.env` server-side and types them via the driver. The MCP response only reports chara…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/scout/scheduler/macos.py:4 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesUser-level only (no root/sudo required).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/secrets.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSearch order for the .env file:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:84 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `SCOUT_ENV_FILE` — Explicit path to `.env` file for secretsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/models.py:351 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_var: str = Field(description="Name of the .env variable used")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/secrets.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files3. ``.env`` in the current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/secrets.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Raised when the .env file cannot be located or loaded."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/secrets.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load credentials from .env files for fill_secret.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/linux.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/server.py:143 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Lazy-load .env file on first use.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/security/scrubbing.py:65 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Scrub values matching .env keys (case-insensitive key match in body)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/security/scrubbing.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_keys: Set of .env key names (case-insensitive match against body field names).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/windows.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/linux.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/capture_annotated_demos.py:306 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/screencast.py:436 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/profile_clone.py:167 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/screencast.py:421 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/secrets.py:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Determine which .env file to load using the three-level search order."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextension/background.js:59 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("[Scout] WebSocket connected, sending auth");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/server.py:145 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe cache is permanent for the server's lifetime. Changes to .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/scout/server.py:756 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# The thread may continue running — asyncio cannot kill threads.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/conftest.py:40 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsself.send_header("Location", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/macos.py:171 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/macos.py:124 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/capture_annotated_demos.py:314 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/macos.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/scheduler/macos.py:159 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/server.py:573 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe server reads the value from the .env file and types it directly into theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/server.py:571 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Type a secret value from .env into a form field without exposing it in the conversation.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageCLAUDE.md:79 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code… `pipx`. It has zero Python logic — it's purely a distribution convenience for `npx -y scout-mcp-server`. ## Environment Variables - `SCOUT_ALLOW_LOCALHOST` — Enabl…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/scout/screencast.py:357 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scout/server.py:578 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_var: Name of the environment variable in .env (e.g., 'APP_PASSWORD').Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/scout/server.py:184 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingproxy: Optional proxy URL (e.g., 'http://user:pass@host:port').Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:50 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file1. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer mode, click "Load unpacked", select the `extension/` directory from the Scout repoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_browse.py:296 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringresult = await browse("http://192.0.2.1/")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_browse.py:296 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameresult = await browse("http://192.0.2.1/")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/chrome-extension.md:15 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file2. Enable **Developer mode** (top-right toggle)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/security-model.md:37 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction filebehavior — e.g., "ignore previous instructions", "navigate to evil.com",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/chrome-extension.md:15 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file2. Enable **Developer mode** (top-right toggle)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_browse.py:250 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsresult = await browse("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagevideo/render.sh:8 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx remotion render src/index.ts ScoutDemo \Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:50 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file1. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer mode, click "Load unpacked", select the `extension/` directory from the Scout repoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:50 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. Open `chrome://extensions`, enable Developer mode, click "Load unpacked", select the `extension/` directory from the Scout repoFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_browse.py:28 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsrequest = httpx.Request("GET", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,255 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for scout-mcp-server@1.8.1 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim stemado: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim stemadoPropose a patch to the maintainer