scopus-plus-mcp@0.24.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Scopus MCP server and more: search, full text, citation networks, journal quality and bibliometrics; OpenAlex without a subscription" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CACHE_TTL_AUTHORSCOPUS_DISABLE_SECRET_STOREConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_TTL_ABSTRACT, CACHE_TTL_DEFAULT, CACHE_TTL_SEARCH, CONTACT_EMAIL, SCOPUS_MAX_RETRIES, SCOPUS_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR, SCOPUS_PAGE_SIZE, SCOPUS_PROXY, SCOPUS_RATE_LIMIT_RETRIES, SCOPUS_SYNC_BUDGET- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso doi.org, crossref.org, semanticscholar.org, openalex.org, elsevier.com, graphdrawing.org, cloudflare.com, arxiv.org, ebi.ac.uk, unpaywall.org, core.ac.uk — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names doi.org, crossref.org, semanticscholar.org, openalex.org, elsevier.com, graphdrawing.org, cloudflare.com, arxiv.org, ebi.ac.uk, unpaywall.org, core.ac.uk as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CACHE_TTL_AUTHOR, SCOPUS_DISABLE_SECRET_STORE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run([*MCPB, 'pack', str(ROOT), str(out)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.row = {(k or '').strip().lstrip(''): v for k, v in row.items()}Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.reader = csv.DictReader(io.StringIO(text.lstrip('')), delimiter='\t', quoting=csv.QUOTE_NONE)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.# Load environment variables from .env file if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.head = text.lstrip('')[:4000]Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.row = {(k or '').strip().lstrip(''): v for k, v in row.items()}Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != 'SCOPUS_API_KEY'}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Filename: fulltext-<doi-slug>.txt under SCOPUS_MCP_OUTPUT_DIR.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.reader = csv.DictReader(io.StringIO(text.lstrip('')))Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items() if k != 'SCOPUS_INSTTOKEN'}Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.subprocess.run([*MCPB, 'validate', str(ROOT / 'manifest.json')], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for scopus-plus-mcp@0.24.0 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim michalhron: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.