Skills/PyPI/scoped-mcp

scoped-mcp@1.22.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Per-agent scoped MCP tool proxy with credential isolation and audit logging" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher tadmstr · publishing for 215 daysInstalls 1,438Last detonated 57 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENT_REGISTRY_DSNMATRIX_ACCESS_TOKENSCOPED_MCP_VAULT_REAUTHConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_ID, AGENT_TYPE, FORGE_RUN_ID, FORGE_TASK_ID, MATRIX_HOMESERVER, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_PROTOCOL, SCOPED_MCP_HEALTH_FILE, SCOPED_MCP_LOG_BACKUPS, SCOPED_MCP_LOG_MAX_BYTES
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ntfy.sh, langfuse.com, influxdata.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ntfy.sh, langfuse.com, influxdata.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENT_REGISTRY_DSN, MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN, SCOPED_MCP_VAULT_REAUTH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx scoped-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.19.2

vet-skills diff scoped-mcp 1.19.2 1.22.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.19.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

1.19.2 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; URL with embedded credentials; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/scoped_mcp/manifest.py:264 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# names a sudo target), so it is configuration, not code.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/scoped_mcp/module_selfheal.py:99 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking``http://user:token@host:port/path?key=secret`` would otherwise publish aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/scoped_mcp/hitl_approver.py:4 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesapprover private key (typically via ``sudo -u <approver-account>``, which asksFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/scoped_mcp/credentials.py:155 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"mode {oct(st.st_mode & 0o777)} is group/other-accessible; run: chmod 600 {path}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scoped_mcp/registry.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .credentials import filter_vault_credentials, resolve_credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/scoped_mcp/audit.py:361 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingA URL is found by its `://`, whatever precedes it, so `-ihttps://u:p@h` andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/scoped_mcp/audit.py:611 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionswould otherwise chmod the home directory.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scoped_mcp/audit.py:219 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (the launcher sources the agent .env into it) whose names look sensitive, and whateverFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressionCHANGELOG.md:108 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction filemodule. It warns and never refuses.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_manifest.py:178 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"config": {"url": "http://192.0.2.11:8485/mcp"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_audit.py:1196 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("a https://u:p@h b http://v:q@i", "a https://***@h b http://***@i"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_audit.py:1194 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("https://u:p@ss@h/x", "https://***@h/x"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_audit.py:1190 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("https://u:p@h/x", "https://***@h/x"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_scoping.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesscope.enforce("/etc/passwd", agent_ctx)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_manifest.py:178 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"config": {"url": "http://192.0.2.11:8485/mcp"},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_hitl.py:790 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injection attemptdocs/threat-model.md:62 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions' · informational: not an instruction file…an agent reads malicious content from a tool response (e.g., a file containing `Ignore previous instructions`) and acts on it, scoped-mcp does not prevent this. Use a prompt injection dete…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_audit.py:1198 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("https://u:p%40ss@h/x", "https://***@h/x"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,847 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for scoped-mcp@1.22.1 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tadmstr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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