Skills/PyPI/scientific-toolkit-mcp

scientific-toolkit-mcp@0.4.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Provider-neutral local and remote MCP hub for nine Furox-Art public research tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher furox-art · publishing for 49 daysInstalls 399Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add scientific-toolkit-mcp -- uvx scientific-toolkit-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SCITOOL_MCP_BEARER_TOKENSCITOOL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPEConfiguration, not credentials: SCITOOL_ALLOW_AUDIT_EXECUTION, SCITOOL_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, SCITOOL_STARTUP_PROBE, SCITOOL_TRUST_PROXY, SCITOOL_WORKSPACE_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SCITOOL_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN, SCITOOL_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPE and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx scientific-toolkit-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscientific_toolkit_mcp/tools.py:288 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscientific_toolkit_mcp/tools.py:204 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_determinism_matrix.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cross_process_determinism.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:183 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:205 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "scientific_toolkit_mcp"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:166 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_oauth.py:59 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# hmac.compare_digest and kill the request; it must be a clean refusal.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈62 tok
1 file · 39 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for scientific-toolkit-mcp@0.4.1 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.