Skills/PyPI/scartissue-mcp

scartissue-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "PR review agent that warns when pull requests reintroduce historical bug patterns. MCP server for Claude Code, Codex CLI, and Gemini CLI." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher shivamsinghnow · publishing for 200 daysInstalls 46Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENTMAIL_API_KEYGITHUB_TOKENNIA_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTMAIL_INBOX_CLIENT_ID, CHROMA_PERSIST_DIR
Where it talks to
scartissue.dev (its own)Also agentmail.to, trynia.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/demo_kit/attacks.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "checkout", _default_branch(dest)], cwd=dest, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/demo_kit/attacks.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "fetch", "--all", "--prune"], cwd=dest, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"/.env*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_server/server.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/demo_kit/attacks.py:78 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", url, str(dest)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/services/git_miner.py:215 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/demo_kit/attacks.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "pull", "--ff-only"], cwd=dest, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/demo_kit/attacks.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈72 tok
1 file · 33 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for scartissue-mcp@0.1.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim shivamsinghnow: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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