sc-imap-mcp@2.3.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Security-focused Model Context Protocol server mediating LLM access to IMAP mailboxes under strict, auditable policy." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
IMAP_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDIMAP_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETIMAP_MCP_TEST_OAUTH_INJECT_ERRORIMAP_MCP_TEST_TOKEN_LIFETIMEConfiguration, not credentials: IMAP_MCP_APPEND_TIMEOUT, IMAP_MCP_CALLER_ID, IMAP_MCP_CONFIG_DIR, IMAP_MCP_CRASH_AT, IMAP_MCP_FAKE_NOW_FILE, IMAP_MCP_FAKE_NOW_UTC, IMAP_MCP_HTTP_HOST, IMAP_MCP_HTTP_PORT, IMAP_MCP_RETRY_LIMIT, IMAP_MCP_SAGA_PAUSE_AT, IMAP_MCP_SAGA_PAUSE_MARKER, IMAP_MCP_TEST_MODE, IMAP_MCP_TEST_TAMPER_PKCE, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects IMAP_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, IMAP_MCP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, IMAP_MCP_TEST_OAUTH_INJECT_ERROR, IMAP_MCP_TEST_TOKEN_LIFETIME only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, check=False, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Add CLAUDE.md and ROADMAP status snapshot for resumptionFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sc-imap-mcp@2.3.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.