Skills/PyPI/sas-mcp

sas-mcp@0.2.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for writing, running, and validating SAS 9.4 code via SASPy" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher matise-joe-norc · publishing for 76 daysInstalls 68Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add sas-mcp -- uvx sas-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso sas.com, adoptium.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sas-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sas_mcp/doctor.py:313 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/sas_mcp/doctor.py:357 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod 600 it.",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_files.py:154 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesr = files.upload(mgr, "input.csv", "/home/u/input.csv")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sas_mcp/session.py:297 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesf"proc datasets library=work kill nolist; quit; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_doctor.py:153 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsassert "chmod 600" in perm.fixFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_files.py:177 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfiles.upload(mgr, "input.csv", "/home/u/input.csv")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_files.py:110 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor evil in ["../../.bashrc", "/etc/passwd", "sub/dir.xlsx"]:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/sas_mcp/doctor.py:370 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"chmod 600 {path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_files.py:156 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert mgr._sas.uploads == [(str(tmp_path / "input.csv"), "/home/u/input.csv")]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_files.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"../escape.xlsx", "a/b.xlsx", r"a\b.xlsx", "/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_files.py:162 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor evil in ["../secret.txt", "/etc/passwd", r"..\..\creds"]:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sas_mcp/init_config.py:83 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([exe, "-version"], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_guards.py:191 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert "x_statement" in rules("data work.a; run; x 'rm -rf /';")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sas_mcp/init_config.py:167 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(["/usr/libexec/java_home"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_guards.py:90 · Destructive file system command detected"x 'rm -rf /data';",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_guards.py:91 · Destructive file system command detected"%sysexec rm -rf /data;",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_guards.py:136 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesassert check("data work.a; kill = 1; run;", DEFAULT).allowedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_guards.py:118 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesassert "datasets_kill" in rules("proc datasets lib=prod kill nolist; quit;")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_guards.py:191 · Destructive file system command detectedassert "x_statement" in rules("data work.a; run; x 'rm -rf /';")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_guards.py:131 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesassert check("proc datasets lib=prod kill nolist; quit;", p).allowedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sas-mcp@0.2.0 as of 34 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

sas-mcp@0.2.0 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills