Skills/PyPI/sar-geo-mcp

sar-geo-mcp@0.43.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "CalTopo interaction hub and geo-computing accessories for SAR" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 725 daysInstalls 439Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add sar-geo-mcp -- uvx sar-geo-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ZA_MAPBOX_TOKENZA_WMS_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SAR_GEO_EXPORTS_DIR, SAR_GEO_LAUNCH_MODE, ZA_ASSIGNMENT_NORMS, ZA_CACHE_DIR, ZA_CALTOPO_ACCOUNT, ZA_CALTOPO_ACCOUNT_ID, ZA_CALTOPO_CONFIG_PATH, ZA_CALTOPO_HOST, ZA_CALTOPO_ID, ZA_CALTOPO_KEY, ZA_GOOGLE_MAPS_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso nationalmap.gov, usda.gov, blm.gov, arcgis.com, usgs.gov, overpass-api.de, private.coffee, project-osrm.org, census.gov — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nationalmap.gov, usda.gov, blm.gov, arcgis.com, usgs.gov, overpass-api.de, private.coffee, project-osrm.org, census.gov as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ZA_MAPBOX_TOKEN, ZA_WMS_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sar-geo-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/sar_geo_mcp/components/files.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(command, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

No other findings across 22,998 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sar-geo-mcp@0.43.0 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.