Skills/PyPI/sapience-mcp

sapience-mcp@0.2.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Human-like memory and a judgment ledger for AI — an MCP server for Claude Code." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher allenc84 · publishing for 117 daysInstalls 125Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add sapience-mcp -- uvx sapience-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EMBEDDINGS_MODEL, EMBEDDINGS_PROVIDER, LEDGER_DB_PATH, LEDGER_DOMAINS, MEMORY_DB_PATH, MEMORY_MIGRATE_DIR, MEMORY_USER_CONTEXT, SAPIENCE_CONSOLIDATE_EVERY_S, SAPIENCE_DATA_DIR, SAPIENCE_MANAGED, SAPIENCE_NAMESPACE, SAPIENCE_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sapience-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssapience/__init__.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env before any submodule import: memory_store, ledger, and schema readFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssapience/schema.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# synthesized briefs, calibration, and bias maps. Override in your .env, e.g.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssapience/__init__.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# so a console-script / uvx / pipx launch must pick up .env here, not in cli().Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsapience/proxy.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_db_lock.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssapience/ledger.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Judgment domains this ledger tracks. Customize via LEDGER_DOMAINS in your .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_proxy.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 36 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sapience-mcp@0.2.1 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.