sapience-mcp@0.2.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Human-like memory and a judgment ledger for AI — an MCP server for Claude Code." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: EMBEDDINGS_MODEL, EMBEDDINGS_PROVIDER, LEDGER_DB_PATH, LEDGER_DOMAINS, MEMORY_DB_PATH, MEMORY_MIGRATE_DIR, MEMORY_USER_CONTEXT, SAPIENCE_CONSOLIDATE_EVERY_S, SAPIENCE_DATA_DIR, SAPIENCE_MANAGED, SAPIENCE_NAMESPACE, SAPIENCE_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Load .env before any submodule import: memory_store, ledger, and schema readFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# synthesized briefs, calibration, and bias maps. Override in your .env, e.g.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# so a console-script / uvx / pipx launch must pick up .env here, not in cli().Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Judgment domains this ledger tracks. Customize via LEDGER_DOMAINS in your .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sapience-mcp@0.2.1 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.