sandbox-env-mcp@0.3.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Sandbox Environment Manager MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SANDBOX_MCP_SERVER_AUTH_TOKENS_FILEConfiguration, not credentials: DOCKER_CERT_PATH, SANDBOX_MCP_CONFIG, SANDBOX_MCP_SERVER_HOST, SANDBOX_MCP_SERVER_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso gnu.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gnu.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SANDBOX_MCP_SERVER_AUTH_TOKENS_FILE only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=connect_timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.check = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."long-running command, kill the shell "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." chmod 600 it. Or set:\n"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# chmod 644Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.check = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.``cat /etc/shadow`` and read it. The advisory exists to give the modelFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Private form used by exec_inspect / kill paths; public alias soFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.is the same: ``/etc/shadow`` and friends, ``~/.ssh``, ``~/.aws``, ``.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.dockerfile="/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.``~/.docker/config.json`` contexts.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.check = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."/etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."/etc/sudoers",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = check_path_safety("~/.ssh/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."/etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "base64 -d" in cmdFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""``../etc/shadow`` must resolve and trigger the advisory."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.the advisory fires. Simulate by writing a real file under /etc/shadowFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sandbox-env-mcp@0.3.1 as of 51 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sandbox-mcp-contributors: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.