sagrada-mcp@0.3.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Sagrada MCP server: track and verify reasoning state for AI systems via Model Context Protocol" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OPENAI_API_KEYOPENROUTER_API_KEYSAGRADA_LLM_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: SAGRADA_BACKEND, SAGRADA_BATTERY, SAGRADA_CRUX, SAGRADA_NO_ML, SAGRADA_POLICY_EDIT, SAGRADA_PROJECT, SAGRADA_PROTECT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for OPENAI_API_KEY, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, SAGRADA_LLM_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# `FOO=1 sudo rm -f AGENTS.lock` yielded NO path assertion and no declaration — a silentFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# (extractors.from_env_text digests `.env` at read time) can still meet a plaintextFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# peel, and `sudo` is still in front afterwards: `FOO=1 sudo pytest` announcedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`https://user:sk-live-…@prod.example.com` put a live credential in a signed artifact,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.wrapper around a shell (`sudo sh -c 'rm AGENTS.lock'`) announced `cmd:unresolved`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# cp / rm / chmod / touch / truncate arguments). Bare literal mentions would haveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# format characters, so `{"url": "https://u:SECRET@h"}` kept a `` firstFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."path:.env.production", "path:.env.staging",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.((".env", ".env.local", ".env.prod", ".env.production", ".env.staging"), from_env_text),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# format characters, so `{"url": "https://u:SECRET@h"}` kept a `` firstFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""`.env` style `KEY=value` → `env:KEY` must-equal beliefs."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# A resource that is a stringified STRUCTURE — `'{"url": "https://u:SECRET@h"}'`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# `.env` is a secrets file, and every value read out of one used to be copied verbatimFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.audit trace decisions rules (plain) vs `.env` state (digested)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.is_pathish = ("/" in lit or _PATH_EXT_RE.search(lit) or lit.startswith(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.belief from `.env`/deps/decisions can gate a real action. Everything stays local andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# bullet list beneath it — `Do not touch these files:` over `- .env` bullets.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# BOTH the literal head and the command it wraps. `sudo pytest` walked straightFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# collision. Two layers: the STATE layer (manifests/.env — what currently is) is scannedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."path:.env", "path:.env.local", "path:.env.prod",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.may already be digested (an old receipt's asserts, a `.env` belief digested at read timeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# `.env`. A rule a human wrote in the policy file (`equals env:DEPLOY_TARGET staging`)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.digests `.env` values at read time and marks them `value_redacted`, so an `env:` entityFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# `--` to fall through to the final `break`, so `sudo -- -- rm -f AGENTS.lock`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Behavioral starter profile (opt-in). The .env family mirrors the exact filenames theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."ByoLLMBattery needs a key — pass api_key=, or set SAGRADA_LLM_API_KEY "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.for marker in ("CLAUDE.md", "AGENTS.lock", "decisions.sagrada", "/etc/passwd"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""`.env` values must never reach a receipt — the repro, preserved.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Redact before serializing. Values extracted from `.env` arrive already digested, but aFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# state package.json / requirements.txt / .env — ordinary config any agent editsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.action its own config bans. `chmod 000 decisions.sagrada` silently disabled enforcement.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.p = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "show", ref_path],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(tmp_path / ".env").write_text(env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.ledger. `chmod 000 requirements.txt` used to drop every halt-eligible `dep:` belief andFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# (er1.schema.json `additionalProperties: true`) and their recompute stops atFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# where the rules are the thing that went missing. `chmod 000 requirements.txt` drops everyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."https://u:tok@h/p?a=b", "/etc/hosts", "deploy://prod", "",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# is over a handful of config files (decisions.sagrada, .env, requirements.txt,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.`.env` became a belief value in plaintext, and a belief value is signed into EVERY receiptFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudo pytest",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# one — `chmod 000 requirements.txt` (itself a permitted action) silently switchedFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.whose committed lock bans `cmd:curl` therefore answered `chmod 000 .git` with a cleanFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."""`chmod 000 decisions.sagrada` silently disabled enforcement.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# cp / rm / chmod / touch / truncate arguments). Bare literal mentions would haveFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."sudo sudo sudo sudo sudo sudo sudo pytest",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."FOO=1 sudo pytest",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."/dev/null", "/etc/passwd", "a.txt", "dir/", ".", "..", "$VAR", "${X}",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."sudo -- -evil arg", # r5 -- ended option skippingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'sh -c "a && rm -rf /tmp/x"',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Verified repro: `Write claude.md` returned a signed ALLOW and PHYSICALLY OVERWROTEFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""The other direction: the value came off the command line, not out of `.env`."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."cp < in /etc/passwd", # r5 input redirect inflated operandsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Measured: `pip install -r sk-live-AKIA…-token.txt` put the credential-Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.f"A key others can read cannot support a continuity claim. Fix with: chmod 600 {priv}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.the trailing space, matching no rule anyone would write), and CLAUDE.md truncated toFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."cd /tmp && echo hi > CLAUDE.md", # cwd genuinely moved before the writeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.("ruby-dash-e", """ruby -e 'File.write("CLAUDE.md","x")'"""),Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.measured ALLOW/HALT split on the same repo. `Write{file_path: "CLAUDE.md"}` — aFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.("Write", {"file_path": "CLAUDE.md", "content": "x"}), # structured + relativeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sagrada-mcp@0.3.1 as of 51 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cruxia-labs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.