Skills/PyPI/sagemath-mcp

sagemath-mcp@0.10.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server that provides stateful SageMath computations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xbp-europe · publishing for 227 daysInstalls 885Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
sagemath.org (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to sagemath.org, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx sagemath-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sagemath_mcp/security.py:802 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (lambda f=open: f('/etc/passwd').readline())()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sagemath_mcp/security.py:803 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Both returned the first line of /etc/passwd, through evaluate_sage andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/sagemath_mcp/security.py:801 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# f = open; f('/etc/passwd').readline()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsrc/sagemath_mcp/policy.py:315 · OS command execution function call detected# *and* is absent from the namespace and the allowlist, so `os.system(...)`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sagemath_mcp/session.py:235 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# kill that reaches only the worker leaves those orphaned andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/sagemath_mcp/prelude.py:29 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u0391\u0392\u0393\u0394\u0395\u0396\u0397\u0398\u0399\u039a\u039b\u039c"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/sagemath_mcp/prelude.py:26 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u03b1\u03b2\u03b3\u03b4\u03b5\u03b6\u03b7\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03bb\u03bc"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sagemath_mcp/server.py:109 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesprobe that fails because a computation is wedged tells Kubernetes to killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/sagemath_mcp/security.py:648 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# os.listdir, os.environ and os.chmod were not -- and the README claimedFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/sagemath_mcp/session.py:592 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# kill and is what remains of the old behaviour everywhere else.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/sagemath_mcp/prelude.py:30 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u039d\u039e\u039f\u03a0\u03a1\u03a3\u03a4\u03a5\u03a6\u03a7\u03a8\u03a9"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/sagemath_mcp/prelude.py:27 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads"\u03bd\u03be\u03bf\u03c0\u03c1\u03c2\u03c3\u03c4\u03c5\u03c6\u03c7\u03c8"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,937 tok
2 files · 59 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sagemath-mcp@0.10.1 as of 41 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim xbp-europe: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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