safe-ssh-mcp@0.2.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "A secure and scoped SSH MCP server for executing safe read-only diagnostic commands over SSH" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# `sudo -n` or `doas -n` (Alpine), whichever the host has. -n makes them fail at onceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."if command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then AS_ROOT='sudo -n'; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`sudo -n` or `doas -n`. Only for the fixed, read-only commands of the few tools thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# as_root — sudo -n / doas -n for the few tools that need rootFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = mcp_ssh.get_systemd_status(daemon="nginx; rm -rf /", host="h", user="u")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# otherwise through sudo -n / doas -n. The direct call comes first so that a docker-groupFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(home / ".env").write_text("SECRET=planted\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(["sudo", "doas"], "0", "docker ps --all (root=1)"), # sudo -nFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# docker_cmd — direct when the daemon is reachable, else sudo -n / doas -nFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = mcp_ssh.get_systemd_status(daemon="nginx; rm -rf /", host="h", user="u")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.service="nginx; cat /etc/shadow", host="h", user="u"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."now; id", "$(id)", "`id`", "1 min ago; rm -rf /", "yesterday | cat",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(["/bin/bash", "-c", cmd], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=home)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."now; id", "$(id)", "`id`", "1 min ago; rm -rf /", "yesterday | cat",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."if command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then AS_ROOT='sudo -n'; "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for safe-ssh-mcp@0.2.1 as of 51 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim areso: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.