Skills/PyPI/sablier-mcp

sablier-mcp@0.13.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Sablier MCP — plug Wall Street-grade portfolio analytics, stress-testing, and SEC filing intelligence into any AI assistant. What takes quants & analysts weeks, done in 2 minutes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sablier-it · publishing for 181 daysInstalls 103Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_TOKEN_SECRETSABLIER_API_KEY or --allow-unauthenticated / --set-secretsConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_ISSUER_URL, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, SABLIER_API_URL
Where it talks to
sablier-ai.com, sablier.ai (its own)Also run.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names run.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_TOKEN_SECRET, SABLIER_API_KEY only into requests to sablier-ai.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_TOKEN_SECRET=sablier-ai.com,SABLIER_API_KEY=sablier-ai.com -- uvx sablier-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:57 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file4. In a new chat, activate via **"+" -> More -> Developer Mode**Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:50 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file### Option B: ChatGPT (Developer Mode)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:52 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file1. Go to **Settings -> Developer Mode** and enable itFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:57 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file4. In a new chat, activate via **"+" -> More -> Developer Mode**Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/sablier_mcp/auth.py:722 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Source+Sans+3:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/sablier_mcp/auth.py:443 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Source+Sans+3:wght@400;500;600;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:50 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file### Option B: ChatGPT (Developer Mode)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/sablier_mcp/auth.py:912 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdetail = resp.json().get("detail", "Invalid input. Please check your fields.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:52 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. Go to **Settings -> Developer Mode** and enable itFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/sablier_mcp/auth.py:643 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering<input type="password" name="password" required placeholder="Enter your password" minlength="8">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈364 tok
2 files · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sablier-it: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sablier-itPropose a patch to the maintainer