Skills/PyPI/rutherford-mcp-server

rutherford-mcp-server@3.3.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "An MCP server that orchestrates a crew of agentic coding agents over the Agent Client Protocol (ACP)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher chapmanjw · publishing for 17 daysInstalls 338Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso agentclientprotocol.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx rutherford-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:136 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Wait for the command to finish (bounded by ``timeout_s``); kill + reap and report -1 on a timeout."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/host_env.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesso :func:`bedrock_remediation_hint` instead points the user at the per-agent ``[agents.<id>.env]`` config thatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/tools/login.py:215 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf"[agents.{agent}.env] in config, then re-run doctor agent={agent}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/rutherford/acp/registry.py:49 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeacp``), an npm-installed one with the npx args (``gemini --acp``).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/conformance.py:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files#: Bedrock/Vertex (or enterprise-wrapped) provider rejected, pointing at the per-agent ``[agents.<id>.env]``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/conformance.py:154 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# over is the same shape the subprocess got -- os.environ with the descriptor's [agents.<id>.env] overridesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rutherford/acp/sandbox.py:463 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed `git` argv0 plus internal subcommands, no shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:149 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Await one shared kill task so cancellation of a caller cannot strand the process or lose ownership."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/rutherford/services/roles.py:74 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentstripped = text.lstrip("") # tolerate a UTF-8 BOM on a Windows-authored fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill / release. ``read_only`` / ``propose`` keep denying terminal execution.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/session.py:123 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: kill the reader that exists to diagnose it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/rutherford/acp/auth.py:402 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking# Any userinfo: `https://user:secret@host/`, or a token as the username (the git / PAT form). A top-levelFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/auth.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvariables go in ``[agents.<id>.env]`` or the server's environment.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/conformance.py:152 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# seat gets a targeted remediation hint (the per-agent [agents.<id>.env] fix). Signature- and host-gated, soFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:231 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603, ASYNC220 - long-lived process drained off-threadFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:67 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: Maximum wait after a hard kill before terminal teardown proceeds to descendant reap and reader cancellation.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/session.py:97 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: The pre-kill descendant enumeration. Bounded because it runs before the adapter kill: a stage that canFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rutherford/acp/adapters.py:121 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - argv is `npm` plus a curated constant, never caller inputFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/host_env.py:238 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesf" [agents.{descriptor.id}.env]\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/config/trust.py:324 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# an owner-only config that can hold [agents.*.env] values.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/server.py:922 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# fastmcp.settings.transport, a pydantic-settings field with env_prefix "FASTMCP_" and .env support,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/client.py:75 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: Deadline on the pre-kill descendant enumeration. Mirrors the session teardown bound: losing theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/rutherford/acp/host_env.py:212 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinference profile). The hint describes the per-agent ``[agents.<id>.env]`` fix -- which lives outside theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/rutherford/acp/registry.py:174 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"""The ``(bin_name, args)`` candidates from the npx distribution (the likely installed-bin names)."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/teardown.py:180 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* It must be bounded. An unbounded await never returns, so the caller never reaches its kill and itsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/teardown.py:176 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesShared by every pre-kill snapshot on purpose. Each caller runs this BEFORE hard-killing the process itFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/session.py:551 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesline would kill the reader whose only job is to explain such an agent.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/teardown.py:380 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Terminate ``procs``, wait briefly, then kill any survivor. Best-effort; never raises."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/session.py:1331 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# * The descendant snapshot is complete before this call, so a hard kill freezes the tree before reap.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/tools/login.py:402 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# its own budget while the kill and reap carry on. Before that, Windows refuses to delete a liveFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rutherford/acp/session.py:1328 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Hard-kill the direct ACP adapter and bound the wait for its process handle to signal exit."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rutherford/services/delegation.py:877 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 - fixed `git` argv0; `args` are internal, `working_dir` is vettedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chapmanjw: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chapmanjwPropose a patch to the maintainer