Skills/PyPI/rustchain-mcp

rustchain-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "AI-agent tools for the RustChain ecosystem: the agentic-AI-native blockchain RustChain (Proof of Antiquity / hardware authenticity), the BoTTube agent-video platform, and the Beacon agent-identity protocol. Query chain state, agent identity, and media provenance (AVAP). RTC rewards optional." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher scottcjn · publishing for 160 daysInstalls 117Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
BOTTUBE_API_KEYMOLTBOOK_API_KEYRUSTCHAIN_EVENT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: BEACON_URL, BOTTUBE_URL, EVANGELIST_WALLET, MOLTBOOK_URL, RUSTCHAIN_CA_BUNDLE, RUSTCHAIN_EVENT_ALLOW_REMOTE, RUSTCHAIN_EVENT_SSE_HOST, RUSTCHAIN_NODE, RUSTCHAIN_TIMEOUT, RUSTCHAIN_TLS_VERIFY, TLS_VERIFY
Where it talks to
rustchain.org (its own)Also bottube.ai, moltbook.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names bottube.ai, moltbook.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects BOTTUBE_API_KEY, MOLTBOOK_API_KEY, RUSTCHAIN_EVENT_TOKEN only into requests to rustchain.org (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets BOTTUBE_API_KEY=rustchain.org,MOLTBOOK_API_KEY=rustchain.org,RUSTCHAIN_EVENT_TOKEN=rustchain.org -- uvx rustchain-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTTP URL with a raw public IP address; Credential pass-through configuration; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressevangelist_agent.py:32 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationrustchain_mcp/server.py:980 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsrelay_token: Your relay token (from beacon_register)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressrustchain_mcp/server.py:1146 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name{"name": "Node 2 (Ergo anchor)", "url": "https://50.28.86.153", "tls_verify": False},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressrustchain_crewai/__init__.py:33 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressevangelist_agent.py:32 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationrustchain_mcp/server.py:1031 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsrelay_token: Your relay token (from beacon_register)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressrustchain_langchain/tools.py:33 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressrustchain_mcp/server.py:1146 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering{"name": "Node 2 (Ergo anchor)", "url": "https://50.28.86.153", "tls_verify": False},Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_default_node.py:4 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering(``https://50.28.86.131``) failed certificate verification on every RustChainFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressrustchain_langchain/tools.py:33 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_ecosystem_tools.py:346 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert by_url["https://50.28.86.153"]["tls_verified"] is FalseFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_ecosystem_tools.py:346 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert by_url["https://50.28.86.153"]["tls_verified"] is FalseFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressrustchain_crewai/__init__.py:33 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringRUSTCHAIN_NODE = os.environ.get("RUSTCHAIN_NODE", "https://50.28.86.131")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_default_node.py:4 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name(``https://50.28.86.131``) failed certificate verification on every RustChainFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,550 tok
2 files · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim scottcjn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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