Skills/PyPI/runwhen-platform-mcp

runwhen-platform-mcp@2026.8.14.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "RunWhen Platform MCP Server — exposes workspace chat, issues, SLXs, run sessions, and Tool Builder (script run/commit) to MCP clients (Cursor, Claude Desktop, etc.)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher runwhen-contrib · publishing for 93 daysInstalls 160Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTH0_AUDIENCEMCP_AUTH0_CLIENT_IDMCP_AUTH0_CLIENT_SECRETMCP_AUTH0_CONFIG_URLMCP_PAPI_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDMCP_PAPI_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETRUNWHEN_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CONTEXT, DEFAULT_WORKSPACE, FASTMCP_STATELESS_HTTP, KUBECONFIG, MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_HOST, MCP_HOST_ORIGIN_PROTECTION, MCP_PORT, MCP_SERVER_LABEL, MCP_TOOL_TRACE, MCP_TRANSPORT, NAME, NAMESPACE, RUNWHEN_AIRGAP, RUNWHEN_APP_URL, RUNWHEN_CONTEXT_FILE, RUNWHEN_REGISTRY_TIMEOUT_S, RUNWHEN_REGISTRY_URL, RUNWHEN_SCRIPT_HARD_MAX_BYTES, RUNWHEN_SCRIPT_SOFT_MAX_BYTES, RUNWHEN_SKILLS_DIR, RW_API_URL, VAR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso runwhen.com, gstatic.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names runwhen.com, gstatic.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTH0_AUDIENCE, MCP_AUTH0_CLIENT_ID, MCP_AUTH0_CLIENT_SECRET, MCP_AUTH0_CONFIG_URL, MCP_PAPI_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, MCP_PAPI_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, RUNWHEN_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx runwhen-platform-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; References a credential file in the home directory; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationrunwhen_platform_mcp/server.py:5586 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"Pass secret_vars_for_author_run (full workspaceKey values) to run_script* or "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-sli-template.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bundled_authoring.py:112 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryskills/build-runwhen-task/references/bash-task-template.sh:21 · References a credential file in the home directoryexport KUBECONFIG="${kubeconfig:-$HOME/.kube/config}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-task-template.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsrunwhen_platform_mcp/consent_ui.py:92 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600&display=swap"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryskills/build-runwhen-task/references/bash-sli-template.sh:16 · References a credential file in the home directoryexport KUBECONFIG="${kubeconfig:-$HOME/.kube/config}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validation.py:106 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_resolve_script(None, "/etc/passwd", None)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈25,827 tok
15 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim runwhen-contrib: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim runwhen-contribPropose a patch to the maintainer