Skills/PyPI/runspec-mcp

runspec-mcp@0.2.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Connect Claude Code to local and remote runspec runnables as MCP tools, from one config file" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 724 daysInstalls 401Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
runspec.app (its own)Also proxy.corp — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to runspec.app, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx runspec-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/executor.py:132 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswe never rewrite the user's ``~/.ssh/known_hosts`` (which is still read forFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/hosts.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ~/.ssh/config. Requires an OpenSSH client on the console machine.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/hosts.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ~/.ssh/config legacy algorithms apply — the way to reach CentOS 6 hostsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/executor.py:555 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuse_ssh_config — when true, ~/.ssh/config is consulted for HostName,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/executor.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# we've seen before — both the user's ~/.ssh/known_hosts (read-only) and ourFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/executor.py:564 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``proxy`` takes precedence over a ProxyCommand from ~/.ssh/config.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrunspec_mcp/executor.py:257 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesthe shell — a command-injection hole, especially under ``sudo -u``. QuotingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/executor.py:563 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPrecedence: per-host/global explicit fields > ~/.ssh/config. An explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryrunspec_mcp/executor.py:563 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryPrecedence: per-host/global explicit fields > ~/.ssh/config. An explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandrunspec_mcp/executor.py:764 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# already exited (e.g. sudo refused) the write fails — its stderr andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSo a user never has to touch ``~/.ssh`` to reach their fleet, runspec-mcp managesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_sshkeys.py:67 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsassert "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" in cmdFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:104 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrunspec_mcp/executor.py:1048 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"touch ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdefault ``~/.ssh/id_*`` keys remain a fallback). ``runspec-mcp copy-key`` installsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrunspec_mcp/executor.py:965 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/ssh_pool.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexisting connection shaping (proxy, ~/.ssh/config, host-key policy, explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/server.py:216 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileshosts are reached with a key the operator never had to set up in ``~/.ssh``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_sshkeys.py:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "chmod 700 ~/.ssh" in cmdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_sshkeys.py:66 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsassert "chmod 700 ~/.ssh" in cmdFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_sshkeys.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" in cmdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrunspec_mcp/executor.py:1104 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandrunspec_mcp/catalog.py:367 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processespass # discovery is best-effort; never kill the loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrunspec_mcp/catalog.py:135 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrunspec_mcp/cli.py:227 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:7 · References a credential file in the home directorydefault ``~/.ssh/id_*`` keys remain a fallback). ``runspec-mcp copy-key`` installsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:104 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrunspec_mcp/sshkeys.py:99 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesCreates ``~/.ssh`` (0700) and ``authorized_keys`` (0600) if missing and appendsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 37 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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