runspec-mcp@0.2.5
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Connect Claude Code to local and remote runspec runnables as MCP tools, from one config file" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- runspec.app (its own)Also proxy.corp — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to runspec.app, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
we never rewrite the user's ``~/.ssh/known_hosts`` (which is still read forFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# ~/.ssh/config. Requires an OpenSSH client on the console machine.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# ~/.ssh/config legacy algorithms apply — the way to reach CentOS 6 hostsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.use_ssh_config — when true, ~/.ssh/config is consulted for HostName,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# we've seen before — both the user's ~/.ssh/known_hosts (read-only) and ourFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.``proxy`` takes precedence over a ProxyCommand from ~/.ssh/config.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.the shell — a command-injection hole, especially under ``sudo -u``. QuotingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Precedence: per-host/global explicit fields > ~/.ssh/config. An explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Precedence: per-host/global explicit fields > ~/.ssh/config. An explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# already exited (e.g. sudo refused) the write fails — its stderr andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.So a user never has to touch ``~/.ssh`` to reach their fleet, runspec-mcp managesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" in cmdFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."touch ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys && "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.default ``~/.ssh/id_*`` keys remain a fallback). ``runspec-mcp copy-key`` installsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.existing connection shaping (proxy, ~/.ssh/config, host-key policy, explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.hosts are reached with a key the operator never had to set up in ``~/.ssh``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "chmod 700 ~/.ssh" in cmdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "chmod 700 ~/.ssh" in cmdFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert "chmod 600 ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" in cmdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.pass # discovery is best-effort; never kill the loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(cmd).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.default ``~/.ssh/id_*`` keys remain a fallback). ``runspec-mcp copy-key`` installsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."mkdir -p ~/.ssh && chmod 700 ~/.ssh && "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Creates ``~/.ssh`` (0700) and ``authorized_keys`` (0600) if missing and appendsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.