Skills/PyPI/rugguard-mcp

rugguard-mcp@0.2.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for RugGuard — pre-trade rug-check API for AI agents. Wraps the x402 payment flow so Claude Desktop, Cursor, and other MCP-aware agents can call RugGuard without speaking x402 themselves." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher dbe006 · publishing for 179 daysInstalls 68Last detonated 43 min ago
$claude mcp add rugguard-mcp -- uvx rugguard-mcp
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
RUGGUARD_X402_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RUGGUARD_API_URL, RUGGUARD_MCP_DAILY_SPEND_CAP_USD, RUGGUARD_MCP_DEMO, RUGGUARD_MCP_DISABLE_TELEMETRY, RUGGUARD_MCP_SESSION_SPEND_CAP_USD, RUGGUARD_MCP_SPEND_LOG_PATH, RUGGUARD_MCP_WALLET_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso redfleet.fr, basescan.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names redfleet.fr, basescan.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects RUGGUARD_X402_PRIVATE_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx rugguard-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 2,459 lines in 19 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈86 tok
1 file · 19 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.