Skills/PyPI/rucio-mcp

rucio-mcp@0.11.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for rucio" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher kratsg · publishing for 234 daysInstalls 227Last detonated 42 min ago
$claude mcp add rucio-mcp -- uvx rucio-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
RUCIO_AUTH_TYPERUCIO_MCP_SHARED_SECRET or --shared-secretConfiguration, not credentials: RUCIO_CLIENT_CERT, RUCIO_CLIENT_KEY, RUCIO_CONFIG, RUCIO_MCP_BROKER_AUDIENCE, RUCIO_MCP_BROKER_ISSUER, RUCIO_MCP_BROKER_JWKS_URL, RUCIO_MCP_BROKER_URL, RUCIO_MCP_RESOURCE_URL, X509_CERT_DIR, X509_USER_PROXY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso cern.ch, giordonstark.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cern.ch, giordonstark.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects RUCIO_AUTH_TYPE, RUCIO_MCP_SHARED_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx rucio-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration.pre-commit-config.yaml:4 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeautoupdate_schedule: "monthly"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:29 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name_CLIENT_URL = "https://93.184.216.34/.well-known/oauth-client"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)CLAUDE.md:160 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network├── server.py # MCPServer setup; _InstrumentedFastMCP; _make_stdio_mcp / _make_site_mcp / _make_http_app;Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:291 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetawait resolve_cimd_client("https://10.0.0.1/client", client=client)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:118 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://192.168.1.1/client",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:117 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"https://10.0.0.5/client",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:29 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering_CLIENT_URL = "https://93.184.216.34/.well-known/oauth-client"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/auth/test_cimd.py:119 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"https://169.254.1.1/client", # link-localFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈6,962 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.