Skills/PyPI/ru-store-mcp

ru-store-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for managing app publishing on RuStore (Android app store)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher eustatos · publishing for 115 daysInstalls 46Last detonated 32 min ago
$claude mcp add ru-store-mcp -- uvx ru-store-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
RUSTORE_PRIVATE_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RUSTORE_KEY_ID, RUSTORE_LOG_LEVEL, RUSTORE_PACKAGE_NAME
Where it talks to
rustore.ru (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for RUSTORE_PRIVATE_KEY and talks to rustore.ru. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets RUSTORE_PRIVATE_KEY=rustore.ru -- uvx ru-store-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… `test_publish.py`. Root config files include `pyproject.toml`, `server.json`, `.env.example`, and `AGENTS.md`. ## Language All code, comments, docstrings, and doc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 10,228 lines in 66 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈762 tok
2 files · 66 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.