Skills/PyPI/rtings-mcp

rtings-mcp@0.3.7

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing RTINGS.com test data as structured tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher averyy · publishing for 212 daysInstalls 575Last detonated 32 min ago
$claude mcp add rtings-mcp -- uvx rtings-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
rtings.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to rtings.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx rtings-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.3.6

vet-skills diff rtings-mcp 0.3.6 0.3.7

This version reaches for something 0.3.6 did not: 1 new host (rtings.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
rtings.com

0.3.6 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:181 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- kill of last resortFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accesssrc/rtings_mcp/cli.py:142 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookiesf"{SESSION_COOKIE_NAME} is HttpOnly, so document.cookie cannot read it and "Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentgibbys-avs.html:1005 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileLoad specific important css to override browsi stylingFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:27 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesplus a pid kill of last resort, and an `atexit` reaper for a loop torn down mid-capture.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accesssrc/rtings_mcp/auth.py:186 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies``_rtings_session`` is **HttpOnly**, so ``document.cookie`` cannot read it and cURL isFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:101 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: and SIGKILLed. 8.0 s clears the slowest seen (5.08 s) with room; the kill stays the lastFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accesssrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:9 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies`document.cookie` cannot see it and a console fallback does not exist — which is why the pasteFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_browser_auth.py:77 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesand the kill fires rather than the teardown running twice as long as promised."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:217 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(_command_line_argv(pid), capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_browser_auth.py:3 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesNo browser is launched. The context, browser and kill are fakes; what runs is the shippedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/rtings_mcp/browser_auth.py:186 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesturns the kill of last resort off and leaves only the graceful path."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandtests/test_browser_auth.py:1 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""The sign-in window's teardown: budgets, the kill of last resort, and abandoning a hung step.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressionSPEC.md:880 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction filewithout `force`, and without a network round-trip. Stored but unproven ⇒ **verify, do not refuseFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentgibbys-avs.html:210 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction filerender social logo override if it is providedFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.