Skills/PyPI/ros2-inspector-mcp

ros2-inspector-mcp@0.3.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Read-only MCP server that lets LLMs inspect and analyze ROS 2 systems (nodes, topics, params, actions) via natural language" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xuchen-ai · publishing for 46 daysInstalls 88Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ros2-inspector-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/ros2_inspector/targets.py:158 · References a credential file in the home directorykey_path = str(Path(key_path).expanduser()) # 容错 "~/.ssh/id_rsa" 写法Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ros2_inspector/targets.py:158 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileskey_path = str(Path(key_path).expanduser()) # 容错 "~/.ssh/id_rsa" 写法Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ros2_inspector/runner.py:422 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/client_smoke.py:64 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceres = await call("get_node_info", {"node": "/x; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ros2_inspector/runner.py:269 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/client_smoke.py:64 · Destructive file system command detectedres = await call("get_node_info", {"node": "/x; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/v02_tests.py:83 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimedef test_file_roundtrip_and_hot_reload() -> None:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/remote_e2e.py:108 · Destructive file system command detected"get_node_info", {"node": "/x; rm -rf /", "target": name}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/fence_tests.py:33 · Destructive file system command detectedexpect_reject(["node", "info", "/n; rm -rf /"]) # shell 注入Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/remote_e2e.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files例: uv run python tests/remote_e2e.py franka-dev 127.0.0.1 2222 root ~/.ssh/id_rsa "ROS开发容器"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/remote_e2e.py:108 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"get_node_info", {"node": "/x; rm -rf /", "target": name}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/fence_tests.py:33 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceexpect_reject(["node", "info", "/n; rm -rf /"]) # shell 注入Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/remote_e2e.py:4 · References a credential file in the home directory例: uv run python tests/remote_e2e.py franka-dev 127.0.0.1 2222 root ~/.ssh/id_rsa "ROS开发容器"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim xuchen-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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