Skills/PyPI/rootly-mcp-server

rootly-mcp-server@2.2.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Secure Model Context Protocol server for Rootly APIs with AI SRE capabilities, comprehensive error handling, and input validation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher rootlyhq · publishing for 607 daysInstalls 4,314Last detonated 6 h ago
$claude mcp add rootly-mcp-server -- uvx rootly-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ONCALLHEALTH_API_KEYROOTLY_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ONCALLHEALTH_API_URL, ROOTLY_ALLOWED_PATHS, ROOTLY_BASE_URL, ROOTLY_HOSTED, ROOTLY_SERVER_NAME, ROOTLY_SWAGGER_PATH
Where it talks to
rootly.com (its own)Also oncallhealth.ai, amazonaws.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names oncallhealth.ai, amazonaws.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ONCALLHEALTH_API_KEY, ROOTLY_API_TOKEN only into requests to rootly.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ONCALLHEALTH_API_KEY=rootly.com,ROOTLY_API_TOKEN=rootly.com -- uvx rootly-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsexamples/skills/README.md:62 · Persistence: instructs the agent to auto-load this skill in future sessionsOr let Claude automatically use the skill when appropriate:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).github/workflows/test.yml:65 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkMCP_SERVER_URL: "http://localhost:8000"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_http_headers.py:31 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_http_headers.py:57 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_http_headers.py:110 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/integration/remote/test_essential.py:195 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexpected_url = os.getenv("MCP_SERVER_URL", "http://localhost:8000")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-hooks.sh:57 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$HOOKS_DIR/pre-commit"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_http_headers.py:73 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_authentication.py:16 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)Dockerfile:30 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkCMD ["rootly-mcp-server", "--transport", "sse", "--log-level", "INFO", "--hosted"]Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/integration/local/test_basic.py:13 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClient, create_rootly_mcp_serverFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/unit/test_http_headers.py:95 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom rootly_mcp_server.server import AuthenticatedHTTPXClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/integration/remote/test_essential.py:23 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkself.url = url or os.getenv("MCP_SERVER_URL", "http://localhost:8000")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈71 tok
1 file · 52 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for rootly-mcp-server@2.2.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.