Skills/PyPI/root-mcp

root-mcp@0.3.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Production-grade MCP server for CERN ROOT file analysis" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mohamedelashri · publishing for 282 daysInstalls 331Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add root-mcp -- uvx root-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ROOT_MCP_AUTH_PROVIDERROOT_MCP_AUTH_REQUIREDConfiguration, not credentials: ROOT_MCP_ALLOW_REMOTE, ROOT_MCP_ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS, ROOT_MCP_ALLOWED_ROOTS, ROOT_MCP_CACHE, ROOT_MCP_CACHE_SIZE, ROOT_MCP_CONFIG, ROOT_MCP_DATA_PATH, ROOT_MCP_DEPLOYMENT_PROFILE, ROOT_MCP_ENABLE_EXPORT, ROOT_MCP_ENABLE_ROOT, ROOT_MCP_EXPORT_FORMATS, ROOT_MCP_EXPORT_PATH, ROOT_MCP_FITTING_ITERATIONS, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_LOCAL, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_ENDPOINT, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_HOST, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_ORIGINS, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_PORT, ROOT_MCP_HTTP_REQUIRE_ORIGIN_HEADER, ROOT_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, ROOT_MCP_MAX_BINS_1D, ROOT_MCP_MAX_BINS_2D, ROOT_MCP_MAX_EXPORT_ROWS, ROOT_MCP_MAX_PATH_DEPTH, ROOT_MCP_MAX_ROWS, ROOT_MCP_MODE, ROOT_MCP_PLOT_DPI, ROOT_MCP_PLOT_FORMAT, ROOT_MCP_PLOT_HEIGHT, ROOT_MCP_PLOT_WIDTH, ROOT_MCP_POLICY_DEFAULT_TOOL_ACTION, ROOT_MCP_RESOURCES, ROOT_MCP_ROOT_BACKEND, ROOT_MCP_ROOT_MAX_CODE, ROOT_MCP_ROOT_MAX_OUTPUT, ROOT_MCP_ROOT_TIMEOUT, ROOT_MCP_ROOT_WORKDIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso smoke.example, client.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names smoke.example, client.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ROOT_MCP_AUTH_PROVIDER, ROOT_MCP_AUTH_REQUIRED only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx root-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/smoke_external_http_client.py:143 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/root_mcp/transport/http.py:278 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"a ROOTMCPServer instance to serve Streamable HTTP."Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py:292 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(_runner.py, _result.json) and the output sub-directory are removedFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/root_mcp/extended/root_native/executor.py:202 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/root_mcp/common/root_availability.py:164 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,623 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.