roo-code-index-bridge-mcp@0.6.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Client-neutral semantic code indexing and search MCP: standalone indexes plus read-only Roo Code compatibility." Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso docker.com, claude.com, zcode.network, opencode.ai, visualstudio.com, astral.sh, openrouter.ai, vercel.sh, mistral.ai, evil.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
base_url="https://name:[email protected]/v1?token=topsecret",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run = subprocess.run([uv, "--system-certs", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'chmod +x "$UV_INSTALL_DIR/uv"\n'Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<h3>No indexes yet</h3> <p>This bridge has not built any standalone index. Build one first — the UI never indexes directories on its own:</p> <pre class="code">Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.rf"\[mcp_servers\.{CODEX_ENTRY}\.env\][^\[]*{CONFIG_ENV_KEY}\s*=\s*'([^']+)'",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.safe_join(tmp_path, "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.block += f"\n[mcp_servers.{CODEX_ENTRY}.env]\n{CONFIG_ENV_KEY} = '{env_value}'\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(command, cwd=REPO_ROOT, env=_check_environment(), check=False).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.qdrant_url="https://name:[email protected]?token=topsecret",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.printf 'Installing uv to %s from the official installer (current user; no sudo needed).\n' "$user_bin"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Start the installed Docker daemon (sudo systemctl start docker), verify docker info, then rerun the same setup command.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.config.write_text(json.dumps({"qdrant_url": "http://alice:password@localhost:6333/?token=private"}))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.targets.append(registry.home / ".codex" / "AGENTS.md")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.holder = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.raise RuntimeError("request http://alice:password@localhost:6333/?token=private failed")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(command, env=env, cwd=repo.parent, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim prakashgarg91: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.