Skills/PyPI/roo-code-index-bridge-mcp

roo-code-index-bridge-mcp@0.6.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Client-neutral semantic code indexing and search MCP: standalone indexes plus read-only Roo Code compatibility." Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher prakashgarg91 · publishing for 43 daysInstalls 137Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso docker.com, claude.com, zcode.network, opencode.ai, visualstudio.com, astral.sh, openrouter.ai, vercel.sh, mistral.ai, evil.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx roo-code-index-bridge-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 22: Setup failed: Could not download the official uv installer.
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.3sprocessexited 22: Setup failed: Could not download the official uv installer.

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_skill_bundle.py:119 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingbase_url="https://name:[email protected]/v1?token=topsecret",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/setup.py:264 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = subprocess.run([uv, "--system-certs", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_bootstrap.py:586 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions'chmod +x "$UV_INSTALL_DIR/uv"\n'Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_discovery.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q"], cwd=tmp_path, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentsrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/ui/index.html:39 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file<h3>No indexes yet</h3> <p>This bridge has not built any standalone index. Build one first — the UI never indexes directories on its own:</p> <pre class="code">Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/setup.py:1376 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrf"\[mcp_servers\.{CODEX_ENTRY}\.env\][^\[]*{CONFIG_ENV_KEY}\s*=\s*'([^']+)'",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_paths.py:99 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessafe_join(tmp_path, "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/setup.py:747 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesblock += f"\n[mcp_servers.{CODEX_ENTRY}.env]\n{CONFIG_ENV_KEY} = '{env_value}'\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_project.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(command, cwd=REPO_ROOT, env=_check_environment(), check=False).returncodeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_setup_remove.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ui_cli.py:122 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_skill_bundle.py:120 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingqdrant_url="https://name:[email protected]?token=topsecret",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:560 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:89 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesprintf 'Installing uv to %s from the official installer (current user; no sudo needed).\n' "$user_bin"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/backend_setup.py:156 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"Start the installed Docker daemon (sudo systemctl start docker), verify docker info, then rerun the same setup command.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_first_run.py:148 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconfig.write_text(json.dumps({"qdrant_url": "http://alice:password@localhost:6333/?token=private"}))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/setup.py:1875 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filetargets.append(registry.home / ".codex" / "AGENTS.md")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:411 · Python subprocess execution detectedholder = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/legacy.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/setup.py:381 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roo_code_index_bridge_mcp/discovery.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_first_run.py:152 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingraise RuntimeError("request http://alice:password@localhost:6333/?token=private failed")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:517 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:222 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(command, env=env, cwd=repo.parent, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_packaging.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,284 tok
3 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim prakashgarg91: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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