Skills/PyPI/rocketride-mcp

rocketride-mcp@1.5.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "[DEPRECATED] RocketRide MCP stdio server — use the engine's built-in HTTP MCP server instead" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher rocketride · publishing for 53 daysInstalls 97Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add rocketride-mcp -- uvx rocketride-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_API_KEYROCKETRIDE_APIKEYROCKETRIDE_AUTHConfiguration, not credentials: ROCKETRIDE_URI
Where it talks to
rocketride.ai, rocketride.org (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_API_KEY, ROCKETRIDE_APIKEY, ROCKETRIDE_AUTH and talks to rocketride.ai, rocketride.org. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MCP_API_KEY=rocketride.ai,ROCKETRIDE_APIKEY=rocketride.ai,ROCKETRIDE_AUTH=rocketride.ai -- uvx rocketride-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:5 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentThis README is both a docs:export source and, unlike the other package READMEs, the site page itself for /connect/mcp/stdio, and gather never stages assets/, soFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

No other findings across 2,453 lines in 20 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.