Skills/PyPI/roblox-studio-mcp

roblox-studio-mcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A lightweight, dependency-free Python client for MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers, with built-in convenience for the Roblox Studio MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bdidk235 · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 259Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso roblox.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx roblox-studio-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:1684 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesthe body called the forced kill immediately and used ``grace_seconds``Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/extensions.py:54 · References a credential file in the home directory# inside the root pointing at ~/.ssh/id_rsa passes an abspath check untouched.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:717 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:724 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:1607 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswrong kill costs the user's unsaved work in an unrelated process. WitnessesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended_server.py:1340 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# kill target could not be corroborated* from the ordinaryFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended_server.py:1299 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# path would rather print one line than guess a PID and kill it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:1729 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesThe two are not equivalent in strictness - ``kill -0`` succeeds for aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/logid.py:1464 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconfidently-wrong kill this resolver exists to prevent.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:1596 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreached ``kill -9``.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:404 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# forced kill is the caller's job, not this function's.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/extensions.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# inside the root pointing at ~/.ssh/id_rsa passes an abspath check untouched.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:356 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:362 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["kill", "-9", str(int(pid))], capture_output=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/client.py:453 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Skip one malformed line; don't kill all pending requests.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:353 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesPOSIX: ``kill -9``.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:397 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:365 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes#: How long a graceful stop request is given before the forced kill follows.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/platform.py:427 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended/instance.py:1727 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Whether ``pid`` is still running. Windows uses CIM, macOS uses ``kill -0``.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/roblox.py:580 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Register the shutdown kill for one connected client, once per client."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/roblox.py:529 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"""Synchronously kill the proxy child if shutdown caught it alive.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/roblox.py:541 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesThe kill alone stops the orphan but not the noise: ``__del__`` still callsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/roblox_studio_mcp/extended_server.py:1348 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"the kill target could not be corroborated by any "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 47 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bdidk235: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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