Skills/PyPI/roblox-assets-mcp

roblox-assets-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "An MCP server for discovering and managing Roblox assets" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher petri-hub · publishing for 9 daysInstalls 667Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ROBLOX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ASSETS_URL, CREATOR_STORE_URL, DELIVERY_URL, REQUEST_TIMEOUT, ROBLOX_OWNER_ID, ROBLOX_OWNER_TYPE, ROBLOX_VALIDATE_SEARCH_ACCESS, THUMBNAILS_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso roblox.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names roblox.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ROBLOX_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx roblox-assets-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:114 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Claude Code</summary> Run this in a terminal. The `user` scope makes the server available across projects: ```sh claude mcp add --transport stdio --scoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/roblox_assets_mcp/config.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(Path.cwd() / ".env", override=False)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:196 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Gemini CLI</summary> Run: ```sh gemini mcp add --scope user \ --env "ROBLOX_API_KEY=YOUR_ROBLOX_OPEN_CLOUD_API_KEY" \ roblox-assets uvx roblox-assets-mFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
README links to an external installerREADME.md → https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Flab-wakapi.petri.ziphttps://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Flab-wakapi.petri.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈53 tok
1 file · 11 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim petri-hub: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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