Skills/PyPI/rigol-dho824-mcp

rigol-dho824-mcp@0.1.143

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for controlling Rigol DHO824 oscilloscopes via AI assistants like Claude - capture waveforms, take screenshots, configure channels, modify triggers, read measurements, and query device state" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher aimoda · publishing for 381 daysInstalls 182Last detonated 28 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso eevblog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx rigol-dho824-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Privileged sudo command; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Codex</summary> ```bash codex mcp add rigol-dho824 -- \ docker run -i --rm \ -v /tmp/rigol-data:/tmp/rigol \ -e RIGOL_RESOURCE="TCPIP0::192.168.1.100::Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_gif.sh:50 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Fedora: sudo dnf install ffmpeg"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.txt:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Codex</summary> ```bash codex mcp add rigol-dho824 -- \ docker run -i --rm \ -v /tmp/rigol-data:/tmp/rigol \ -e RIGOL_RESOURCE="TCPIP0::192.168.1.100::Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_gif.sh:175 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Fedora: sudo dnf install gifsicle"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_gif.sh:51 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Arch: sudo pacman -S ffmpeg"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_webp.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install webp"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_webp.sh:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Arch: sudo pacman -S libwebp"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:26 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R mcp:mcp /app /tmp/rigolFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_gif.sh:49 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install ffmpeg"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)manuals/DHO800900_ProgrammingGuide_EN.md:8242 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)μVrmsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_webp.sh:42 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Fedora: sudo dnf install libwebp-tools"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload action.github/workflows/docker.yml:134 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesprint(f'Updated server.json to version ${{ steps.version.outputs.version_full }}')Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/convert_png_to_gif.sh:174 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " Ubuntu/Debian: sudo apt install gifsicle"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,113 tok
2 files · 29 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for rigol-dho824-mcp@0.1.143 as of 7 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aimoda: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim aimodaPropose a patch to the maintainer