Skills/PyPI/resolve-mcp

resolve-mcp@0.1.6

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server with 215+ tools for DaVinci Resolve scripting API (v20.3)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jenkinsm13 · publishing for 267 daysInstalls 532Last detonated 42 min ago
$claude mcp add resolve-mcp -- uvx resolve-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RESOLVE_SCRIPT_API
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ffmpeg.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ffmpeg.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx resolve-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/ffprobe.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/transcode.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsresolve_mcp/config.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Set GEMINI_API_KEY in .env for AI bridge tools (optional).\n\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/transcode.py:120 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=3600, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/ffprobe.py:124 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/ffprobe.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/ffprobe.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedresolve_mcp/ffprobe.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandresolve_mcp/ingest_tools.py:60 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges" Ubuntu: sudo apt install ffmpeg\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathshooks/hooks.json:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"command": "if echo \"$CLAUDE_TOOL_INPUT\" | grep -qE '\\.env\"|\\.env$'; then echo 'BLOCKED: Do not edit .env files — they contain API keys' >&2; exit 1; fi"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths.claude/settings.json:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"command": "if echo \"$CLAUDE_TOOL_INPUT\" | grep -qE '\\.env\"|\\.env$'; then echo 'BLOCKED: Do not edit .env files — they contain API keys' >&2; exit 1; fi"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈14,161 tok
19 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.