remoteshell-mcp@1.1.4
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for managing SSH connections and executing remote commands" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"private_key": "~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/root(?:\s|$)', 'rm -rf /root'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."rm -rf /etc/sudoers",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.dangerous_command = "rm -rf /"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /root",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /home",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /tmp",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\*', 'rm -rf /*'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\*', 'rm -rf /*'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\s+', 'rm -rf /'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\s+', 'rm -rf /'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."rm -rf /*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><b>Antigravity</b></summary> Edit `~/.gemini/config/mcp_config.json` (global) or `.agents/mcp_config.json` (project): ```json { "mcpServers": { "remoteFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>OpenClaw</b></summary> Edit `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json`: ```json { "mcp": { "servers": { "remoteshell": { "command": "uvx", "args": ["remoteshell-mcFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\s*$', 'rm -rf /'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(r'\b(?:cat|cp|mv|tar|dd|scp|nc|rsync)\s+.*(?:/etc/shadow|/etc/passwd|/etc/sudoers|/root/\.|/home/.*?/\.ssh)',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.(r'\brm\s+-rf\s+/\s*$', 'rm -rf /'),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."rm -rf /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b>Hermes Agent</b> (NousResearch)</summary> Edit `~/.hermes/config.yaml`: ```yaml mcp_servers: remoteshell: command: "uvx" args: ["remoteshell-mcp"] `Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."private_key": "~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."rm -rf /*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."rm -rf /*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chouzz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.