remote-sandbox-mcp@0.7.6
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for SSH-based remote sandboxes: multi-server management, persistent sessions, background tmux tasks, and GPU/CPU/memory resource monitoring" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
REMOTE_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: REMOTE_HOST, REMOTE_KEY_FILE, REMOTE_KEY_PASSPHRASE, REMOTE_PORT, REMOTE_SANDBOX_EXPOSE_ADVANCED_TOOLS, REMOTE_SANDBOX_LIST, REMOTE_SANDBOX_MCP_HOME, REMOTE_USER, XDG_STATE_HOME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for REMOTE_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Use a different session_name or kill the existing session first with: "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.key_file: str = "" # Path to private key file, e.g. "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.'[{"name":"gpu1","host":"10.0.0.1","user":"ubuntu","key_file":"~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}]'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."or: sudo yum install tmux (CentOS/RHEL)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"chmod 700 {shlex.quote(script_path)}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.'[{"name":"gpu1","host":"10.0.0.1","user":"ubuntu","key_file":"~/.ssh/id_ed25519"}]'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.key_file: str = "" # Path to private key file, e.g. "~/.ssh/id_ed25519"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Install it with: sudo apt-get install tmux (Debian/Ubuntu) "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.f"chmod 700 {shlex.quote(script_path)}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim debinxiangquantum: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.