Skills/PyPI/remote-pc-mcp

remote-pc-mcp@0.6.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Expose any PC's capabilities - shell, filesystem, background processes, system stats, screenshots, UI control, and file transfer - to any MCP client over streamable HTTP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher raghibrm · publishing for 28 daysInstalls 668Last detonated 43 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: REMOTE_PC_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, REMOTE_PC_MCP_HOME, REMOTE_PC_MCP_HOST, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_READ_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_SHELL_TIMEOUT, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_WRITE_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_PORT, REMOTE_PC_MCP_SCREEN_MAX_EDGE, REMOTE_PC_MCP_SCREEN_MAX_PIXELS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx remote-pc-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandremote_pc_mcp/server.py:671 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn {"error": "No screenshot tool found. On Linux install scrot: sudo apt install scrot"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsremote_pc_mcp/server.py:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(_APP_DIR / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandremote_pc_mcp/server.py:865 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# doesn't permanently kill the listener. Back off exponentially so aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_process.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', 'import time; time.sleep(120)'])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsremote_pc_mcp/server.py:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env lives in the app dir (repo root for a clone via the root shims'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedremote_pc_mcp/server.py:666 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsremote_pc_mcp/__init__.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Directory for this server's .env, logs, and .state.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedremote_pc_mcp/daemon.py:125 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsremote_pc_mcp/server.py:847 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessys.exit("ERROR: REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKEN not set. Copy .env.example → .env and fill it in.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedremote_pc_mcp/server.py:250 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedremote_pc_mcp/server.py:418 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedremote_pc_mcp/server.py:453 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=out, stderr=err, cwd=working_dir)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandremote_pc_mcp/server.py:231 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# 1 s CPU sample, a 4K screenshot, a 5 s kill wait) froze every other request,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_screenshot.py:168 · Python subprocess execution detectedtarget = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈79 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim raghibrm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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