remote-pc-mcp@0.6.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Expose any PC's capabilities - shell, filesystem, background processes, system stats, screenshots, UI control, and file transfer - to any MCP client over streamable HTTP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: REMOTE_PC_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, REMOTE_PC_MCP_HOME, REMOTE_PC_MCP_HOST, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_READ_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_SHELL_TIMEOUT, REMOTE_PC_MCP_MAX_WRITE_BYTES, REMOTE_PC_MCP_PORT, REMOTE_PC_MCP_SCREEN_MAX_EDGE, REMOTE_PC_MCP_SCREEN_MAX_PIXELS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return {"error": "No screenshot tool found. On Linux install scrot: sudo apt install scrot"}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.load_dotenv(_APP_DIR / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# doesn't permanently kill the listener. Back off exponentially so aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, '-c', 'import time; time.sleep(120)'])\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# .env lives in the app dir (repo root for a clone via the root shims'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Directory for this server's .env, logs, and .state.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sys.exit("ERROR: REMOTE_PC_MCP_TOKEN not set. Copy .env.example → .env and fill it in.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True, stdout=out, stderr=err, cwd=working_dir)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 1 s CPU sample, a 4K screenshot, a 5 s kill wait) froze every other request,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.target = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim raghibrm: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.