registry-mcp@0.4.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "The company registry MCP: company data for AI agents, any country. MCP server and REST API over national business registries — Norway (brreg / Brønnøysundregistrene / Enhetsregisteret, by organisasjonsnummer, orgnr or org.nr), the United Kingdom (Companies House, by company number / CRN) and Sweden (Bolagsverket, by organisationsnummer)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYCOMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: REGISTRY_MCP_CACHE_DISABLED, REGISTRY_MCP_CONTACT_EMAIL, REGISTRY_MCP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso service.gov.uk, brreg.no, bolagsverket.se, gleif.org, foretak.dev, gov.uk, peppol.eu, xbrl.org, lagen.nu, example.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names service.gov.uk, brreg.no, bolagsverket.se, gleif.org, foretak.dev, gov.uk, peppol.eu, xbrl.org, lagen.nu, example.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, COMPANIES_HOUSE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
under Settings → Connectors, turn on **Settings → Security and login → Developer mode** first,Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent._mcp_app = mcp_server.http_app(path="/mcp")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.<summary><b>npm instead of uvx</b> — same server, Node launcher</summary> ```json { "mcpServers": { "registry-mcp": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "registryFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.under Settings → Connectors, turn on **Settings → Security and login → Developer mode** first,Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.RUN mkdir -p /app/data && chown -R app:app /app/dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.