reeflex-mcp@0.1.5
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Reeflex MCP gateway -- a transparent MCP proxy that governs any MCP upstream: intercepts tools/call, normalizes it into a Reeflex Action Envelope, asks reeflex-core /v1/decide, and enforces the verdict. Zero LLM in the decision path." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
REEFLEX_CORE_TOKENREEFLEX_MCP_ADMIN_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: REEFLEX_CORE_URL, REEFLEX_MCP_CALL_TIMEOUT, REEFLEX_MCP_CONFIG, REEFLEX_MCP_HOST, REEFLEX_MCP_MAPPINGS_DIR, REEFLEX_MCP_PORT, REEFLEX_MCP_TIMEOUT, REEFLEX_MCP_TRANSPORT, REEFLEX_MCP_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, REEFLEX_MODE, REEFLEX_VERIFY_SSL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mcp.internal — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mcp.internal as well as its own vendor. The guard injects REEFLEX_CORE_TOKEN, REEFLEX_MCP_ADMIN_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
… an upstream | | `REEFLEX_MCP_MAPPINGS_DIR` | unset | directory of declarative `<system>.yaml` mappings (Track 4) -- overrides the YAML `mappings_dir:` key; unset on bo…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.def _try_hot_reload(gateway_url: str | None) -> Tuple[bool, str]:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.__aexit__ (the real StdioUpstreamConnection's process-kill teardown, inFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.BaseException -- mirrors what stdio_client()'s baked-in process-killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# (npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem <allowed-dir>...).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…close() down. stdio_client() has no terminate_on_close knob to skip its process-kill teardown; shielding stops an ancestor's in-flight cancellation from racing anyio…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.help="stdio command + args, e.g. --command npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /data")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.raise ConfigError(f"reeflex-mcp config: upstream {name!r}.env must be a mapping if present")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return 0 # the upstream IS registered either way -- hot-reload is a best-effort convenienceFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."""Track 5 (design doc section 13) `add`/`import` hot-reload: connectFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return True, f"gateway at {url} hot-reloaded: connected {added}, tools/list_changed broadcast to front sessions."Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# one. Real annotation in unrestricted mode: destructiveHint: true.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reeflex-io: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.