Skills/PyPI/redesign-clickup-mcp

redesign-clickup-mcp@1.5.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Clickup MCP server for research agent" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yuri-oliveira-yuri.oliveira · publishing for 11 daysInstalls 152Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add redesign-clickup-mcp -- uvx redesign-clickup-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLICKUP_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLICKUP_MAX_RESPOSTA_KB, CLICKUP_MAX_UPLOAD_MB, CLICKUP_USER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso clickup.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names clickup.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLICKUP_API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx redesign-clickup-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/clickup_mcp/config.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescaminho = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 3,512 lines in 40 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for redesign-clickup-mcp@1.5.3 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.