Skills/PyPI/reddit-research-mcp

reddit-research-mcp@1.0.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A minimal Model Context Protocol server for Reddit content access" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher king-of-the-grackles · publishing for 433 daysInstalls 144Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CHROMA_PROXY_API_KEYREDDIT_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: AUDIENCE_API_URL, CHROMA_PROXY_URL, DESCOPE_BASE_URL, DESCOPE_PROJECT_ID, REDDIT_CLIENT_ID, REDDIT_USER_AGENT, SERVER_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso reddit.com, descope.com, onrender.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names reddit.com, descope.com, onrender.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CHROMA_PROXY_API_KEY, REDDIT_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx reddit-research-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:195 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><strong>Authentication</strong></summary> Dialog uses **Descope OAuth2** for secure authentication: - **Setup**: No Reddit credentials needed - server Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:431 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file1. **Enable Developer Mode** in ChatGPT settingsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Find .env file in project rootFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:434 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file4. **Register app** in ChatGPT Developer Mode with server URLFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:41 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Public Sharing**: Not yet available; developers can build and test in Developer Mode onlyFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:438 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file**Developer Mode Limitations**:Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Method 2: Try loading from .env file (local development)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:939 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- [ ] App registers in ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"and REDDIT_CLIENT_SECRET either as OS environment variables or in a .env file"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.specify/scripts/bash/update-agent-context.sh:48 · Destructive file system command detected…ONS END -->/d' "$target_file"; cat /tmp/manual_additions.txt >> "$target_file"; rm /tmp/manual_additions.txt "$target_file.bak"; fi; fi; mv "$temp_file" "$target_fi…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:438 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**Developer Mode Limitations**:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:24 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- Developers can build and test in Developer ModeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.py:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(__file__).parent.parent / '.env'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:830 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- [ ] Human enables ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:431 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. **Enable Developer Mode** in ChatGPT settingsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:939 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- [ ] App registers in ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:830 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- [ ] Human enables ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:106 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Testing**: Requires iteration in ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:1120 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file3. **Enable Developer Mode** in ChatGPT:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:434 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file4. **Register app** in ChatGPT Developer Mode with server URLFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:106 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Testing**: Requires iteration in ChatGPT Developer ModeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:427 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file### Developer Mode & TestingFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:427 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file### Developer Mode & TestingFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionspecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:41 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Public Sharing**: Not yet available; developers can build and test in Developer Mode onlyFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/server.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/openai-apps-sdk-compatibility.md:24 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- Developers can build and test in Developer ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagespecs/external-sdks/openai-apps-sdk-comprehensive-guide.md:431 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file1. **Enable Developer Mode** in ChatGPT settingsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 55 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for reddit-research-mcp@1.0.1 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim king-of-the-grackles: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim king-of-the-gracklesPropose a patch to the maintainer