Skills/PyPI/redaction-mcp

redaction-mcp@1.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "A MCP server library to provide Document Redaction and Data replacement capabilities to AI Agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher hardyslays · publishing for 105 daysInstalls 153Last detonated 22 h ago
$claude mcp add redaction-mcp -- uvx redaction-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FASTAPI_AUTH_TOKENMCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FASTAPI_HOST, FASTAPI_PORT, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, REDACTION_JOB_RETENTION_SECONDS, REDACTION_JOB_WORKERS, REDACTION_STORAGE_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for FASTAPI_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx redaction-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_fastapi.py:146 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesupload_id = created.json()["upload_id"]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 5,852 lines in 51 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 51 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for redaction-mcp@1.1.0 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.