recruit-crm-mcp@0.19.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for Recruit CRM" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
RECRUIT_CRM_API_KEYRECRUIT_CRM_MCP_SENTRY_DSNSENTRY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: RCRM_SMOKE_WRITES, RECRUIT_CRM_MCP_ENV, RECRUIT_CRM_MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_RATE- Where it talks to
- recruitcrm.io (its own)Also astral.sh, linkedin.com, githubusercontent.com, stoplight.io, python-httpx.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, linkedin.com, githubusercontent.com, stoplight.io, python-httpx.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects RECRUIT_CRM_API_KEY, RECRUIT_CRM_MCP_SENTRY_DSN, SENTRY_DSN only into requests to recruitcrm.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
and rejection guard tests for sort params. Update CLAUDE.md with API gotchas and TDD workflow forFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Usage: curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ebragas/recruitcrm-mcp/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.["sh", "-c", "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Usage: curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ebragas/recruitcrm-mcp/main/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Requires RECRUIT_CRM_API_KEY in environment (loaded from .env via pytest-dotenv).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(" curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary>Want to review the script first?</summary> **macOS / Linux:** ```bash curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ebragas/recruitcrm-mcp/main/install.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Usage: curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ebragas/recruitcrm-mcp/main/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Update CLAUDE.md to reflect eager client init patternFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.["sh", "-c", "curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Add Copilot review request step to the workflow in CLAUDE.md and ensure the review-pr-comments skillFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for recruit-crm-mcp@0.19.0 as of 45 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ebragas: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.