Skills/PyPI/real-estate-sustainability-mcp

real-estate-sustainability-mcp@0.0.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for analyzing building sustainability metrics through Excel, PDF, and standardized frameworks (ESG, LEED, BREEAM, DGNB) with IFC integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher luke-luke · publishing for 305 daysInstalls 61Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add real-estate-sustainability-mcp -- uvx real-estate-sustainability-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: DATABASE_PATH, FASTMCP_HOST, FASTMCP_PORT, LANGFUSE_HOST, LANGFUSE_PUBLIC_KEY
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso langfuse.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names langfuse.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects LANGFUSE_SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx real-estate-sustainability-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/README.md:161 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file"""Check if the current context has admin privileges."""Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.github/workflows/cd.yml:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# mkdir -p ~/.kubeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageTOOLS.md:322 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileTo enable admin access, override the `is_admin` function in `app/server.py` with your authentication logic.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptTOOLS.md:210 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file- `enabled` (boolean, optional): Whether to enable test context mode. Default: `true`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageTOOLS.md:312 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileAdmin tools are registered but require admin privileges (disabled by default).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file paths.github/workflows/cd.yml:140 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# echo "${{ secrets.KUBECONFIG }}" | base64 -d > ~/.kube/configFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directory.github/workflows/cd.yml:140 · References a credential file in the home directory# echo "${{ secrets.KUBECONFIG }}" | base64 -d > ~/.kube/configFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈802 tok
2 files · 47 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for real-estate-sustainability-mcp@0.0.2 as of 45 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.