Is reach-mcp@0.7.5 safe to install?

reach-mcp@0.7.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Multi-source search MCP server for AI agents. Search Reddit, X, YouTube, HN, GitHub, arXiv, Polymarket, 微博, 知乎, 豆瓣, 头条, 雪球, V2EX, B站, 小宇宙 & more — 30 sources across Chinese & English platforms with adjustable time window, source/category scoping, trending hot lists, and optional LLM synthesis." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher xyonium-shark_xc · publishing for 106 daysInstalls 316Last detonated 1 h ago

$claude mcp add reach-mcp -- uvx reach-mcp

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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.

Tested: the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: APIFY_API_TOKENAUTH_TOKENBRAVE_API_KEYEXA_API_KEYFIRECRAWL_API_KEYGH_TOKENJINA_API_KEYSCRAPECREATORS_API_KEYTAVILY_API_KEYTRUTHSOCIAL_TOKENXIAOYUZHOU_ACCESS_TOKENXQUIK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: APIFY_BASE_URL, CT0, EXA_BASE_URL, FIRECRAWL_API_URL, GITHUB_BASE_URL, LINUXDO_COOKIE, REACH_MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, REACH_MCP_READ_TIMEOUT, RSS_FEEDS, SEARXNG_URL, TAVILY_BASE_URL, X_TRENDS_LOCATION, XHS_MCP_URL, XUEQIU_COOKIE, YTDLP_COOKIES, YTDLP_PROXY, ZHIHU_COOKIE
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the codeAlso savorcare.com, exa.ai, linux.do, jina.ai, tavily.com, apify.com, scrapecreators.com, threads.net, tiktok.com, arxiv.org, bilibili.com, bsky.app, douban.com, dripstack.com, algolia.com, ycombinator.com, lobste.rs, polymarket.com, reddit.com, stackexchange.com, stocktwits.com, techmeme.com, toutiao.com, truthsocial.com, sov2ex.com, v2ex.com, brave.com, weibo.cn, x.com, xquik.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names savorcare.com, exa.ai, linux.do, jina.ai, tavily.com, apify.com, scrapecreators.com, threads.net, tiktok.com, arxiv.org, bilibili.com, bsky.app, douban.com, dripstack.com, algolia.com, ycombinator.com, lobste.rs, polymarket.com, reddit.com, stackexchange.com, stocktwits.com, techmeme.com, toutiao.com, truthsocial.com, sov2ex.com, v2ex.com, brave.com, weibo.cn, x.com, xquik.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects APIFY_API_TOKEN, AUTH_TOKEN, BRAVE_API_KEY, EXA_API_KEY, FIRECRAWL_API_KEY, GH_TOKEN, JINA_API_KEY, SCRAPECREATORS_API_KEY, TAVILY_API_KEY, TRUTHSOCIAL_TOKEN, XIAOYUZHOU_ACCESS_TOKEN, XQUIK_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx reach-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·

0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed

0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Process kill commandsrc/reach_mcp/sources/youtube.py:49 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswould silently kill the cookie path).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

No other findings across 12,323 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈108 tok

1 file · 81 in bundle

Tool list per prompt

≈0 tok

0 tools · 0 per tool

Handshake

no reply

launch to tools/list, stdio

Undocumented tools

description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for reach-mcp@0.7.5 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.