Skills/PyPI/rbi-source-mcp

rbi-source-mcp@0.9.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "An MCP server for RBI Master Directions: version-aware, citation-first, knows what's withdrawn." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher harshil-mathur · publishing for 194 daysInstalls 63Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CF_API_TOKENGITHUB_TOKENPOSTHOG_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CF_ACCOUNT_ID, FLY_MACHINE_ID, FLY_REGION, HF_HOME, HUGGINGFACE_HUB_CACHE, MCP_INSTANCE_ID, MCP_REGION, POSTHOG_HOST, RBI_EMBEDDING_DIM, RBI_EMBEDDING_MODEL, RBI_EMBEDDING_PROVIDER, RBI_LOCAL_MODEL_REVISION, RBI_SOURCE_DB, RBI_SOURCE_DB_NEW, RBI_SOURCE_HOST, RBI_SOURCE_PORT, RBI_TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDRS, RBI_TRUSTED_PROXY_HEADERS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso rbi.org.in, cloudflare.com, huggingface.co, githubusercontent.com, posthog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/rbi_source_mcp/doctor.py:299 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"chmod the directory writable, OR set $HF_HOME to a path you own:\n"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/rbi_source_mcp/extractor/pdf.py:81 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:73 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv /tmp/actionlint /usr/local/bin/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_http_server.py:142 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor url in ("/favicon-99.png", "/index.html", "/server.py", "/etc/passwd"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationCLAUDE.md:256 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime…h-corpus` + `rbi-source-doctor` | ✓ landed in v0.8 | | **Hosted-instance corpus auto-update** | ✓ landed in v0.8.4 — in-container sidecar polls latest-corpus every 6h, sigstore-verifies, atomic-swaps. Previously required a manual `deploy-c…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compare_3way.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compare_ab.py:42 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,431 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for rbi-source-mcp@0.9.0 as of 43 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim harshil-mathur: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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