Skills/PyPI/quipu-mcp

quipu-mcp@0.3.9

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Quipu local-first agent memory system with MCP server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 724 daysInstalls 62Last detonated 14 min ago
$claude mcp add quipu-mcp -- uvx quipu-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYQUIPU_HUB_TOKENQUIPU_SECRET_POLICYConfiguration, not credentials: QUIPU_ALLOW_TEST_HOOKS, QUIPU_CLIENT_ID, QUIPU_CONFLICTS_PATH, QUIPU_DB_PATH, QUIPU_EMBEDDING_MODEL, QUIPU_HUB_CA, QUIPU_HUB_URL, QUIPU_KEY, QUIPU_MODE, QUIPU_MODEL_DIR, QUIPU_MODEL_SHA256, QUIPU_PASSPHRASE, QUIPU_PROJECT_ID, QUIPU_PROJECT_ROOT, QUIPU_TEST_FAKE_EMBED, QUIPU_VEC_THRESHOLD
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, QUIPU_HUB_TOKEN, QUIPU_SECRET_POLICY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx quipu-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsquipu/capture/secrets.py:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files7. .env-style KEY=value with secret keywordFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsquipu/capture/secrets.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env-style assignment with keyword gate: KEY=value (8+ char value)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈48 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.